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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect 
produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale 
before engaging in a 2 2× coordination game. The main finding is that the act of 
stating one’s own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. In 
particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy more often when they 
have previously stated their attitudes to risk. Within a best-response correspondence 
framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or 
beliefs. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not induce a change in 
subjects’ beliefs. We argue that the behavioral arguments of strategy selection, such 
as focal points, framing and uncertain preferences can explain our results. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Survey questions are often employed to collect information about people’s risk 
preferences. This information is then used to either make predictions about 
behavioral choices in subsequent decision situations involving risk or uncertainty or, 
as is often done in consumer finance, to tailor investment advice to the client’s level 
of risk tolerance. Elicitation of risk preferences by means of survey questions is 
attractive because of its simplicity and low administration costs. There are, however, 
at least two problems associated with the use of survey questions. First, it is 
questionable whether they provide a good method for measuring risk preferences. 
One major concern is that survey questions are incentive-incompatible. Furthermore, 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) argue that one-dimensional risk questions (e.g. 
“How risk tolerant are you?”) measure only a small part of the multidimensional 
nature of risk and that most people overestimate their preference for risk in these 
situations. Second, survey research implicitly assumes that the act of answering 
questions does not influence people’s personal characteristics or their behavior in 
later decision situations. In light of empirical evidence from psychological studies, 
however, this assumption is not easy to justify. For example, Morwitz, Johnson and 
Schmittlein (1993) showed that asking a simple question about purchase intent 
increased the actual rates of automobile purchase in the subsequent six months by 
more than 35 percent. They labeled this phenomenon the mere-measurement effect. 
For a review of studies replicating this effect and a discussion of possible 
explanations see e.g., Levav and Fitzsimons (2006). 
 In this study we are concerned with the effect that risk questions produce on 
behavioral choices. While research on the mere-measurement effect shows that the 
likelihood of engaging in certain behavior (e.g., voting, smoking, buying etc.) is not 
independent of answering questions of intent, we are interested in investigating 
whether the question-behavior link observed by Morwitz, Johnson and Schmittlein 
(1993) applies equally to other than intent questions and to decision situations other 
than one explicitly linked to the questions asked. A frequently used type of survey 
questions asks people to assess (usually on a scale) their own attitudes. For example, 
one question in the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP) asks subjects to 
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assess their general risk preferences on a scale of 0 (not at all willing to take risks) to 
10 (very willing to take risks). 
 We aim to achieve two goals. The first is to examine whether asking subjects to 
assess and state their own risk preferences influences behavior in a subsequently 
played economic game. Specifically, we study whether strategy choices in a one-
shot 2 2×  coordination game are altered by the act of reporting one’s attitude toward 
risk. We stress the point that we seek to examine the link between the risk questions 
and behavior, and we do not claim that the survey questions we use provide a 
reliable measure of risk preferences. The second goal is to gain valuable insights 
into whether strategy selection in coordination games is consistent with deductive 
analysis. Both of these objectives are addressed through a single laboratory 
experiment whose results are then interpreted accordingly. 
 Much research, both theoretical and experimental, has been dedicated to 
studying the equilibrium selection problem in coordination games (e.g., Harsanyi 
and Selten 1988, Carlsson and van Damme 1993, Van Huyck et al. 1990, Cooper et 
al. 1992, Berninghaus et al., 2002). The majority of existing research, however, 
relies heavily on deductive analysis, and inductive methods of equilibrium choice 
are hardly considered. Deductive equilibrium analysis prescribes what strategy 
choices rational players will make, under the assumption of common knowledge of 
rationality, if they use only the information provided by the game, i.e., strategy 
space and payoff structure. In other words, subjects’ strategy choices are assumed to 
be independent of historical accidents and dynamic processes. Whether this 
assumption is a good proxy of the real decision making process is an empirical 
question. Van Huyck et al. (1990), for example, report experimental results from 
repeated-period coordination games that show little evidence of decision making 
based on deductive methods. In this study, we investigate whether a simple non-
strategic decision situation (i.e., assessing and stating one’s own risk preferences) 
unrelated to the coordination game systematically alters strategic behavior in 
coordination games, and with this we hope to provide another piece of evidence 
showing the ability of deductive analysis to explain actual choices. 
 To study the link between reporting one’s own risk preferences and strategy 
choices in coordination games, we use a two-conditions, between-subject design. In 
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one condition, we ask participants to answer a short questionnaire about their risk 
preferences and immediately after this we have them play a 2 2× coordination game 
characterized by two Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The questionnaire 
consists of three questions, all of which are derived from the general risk question in 
the SOEP survey. The questions were carefully formulated so that they did not 
suggest any level of risk tolerance—risk loving, risk neutral or risk averse. In the 
other condition, subjects played the coordination game right away. 
 Our experimental results reveal significant evidence that completing the 
questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences systematically changes strategy 
choices made in the subsequently played 2 2×  coordination game. Around two-
thirds of the subjects who played the coordination game without having previously 
completed the questionnaire chose the Pareto dominant strategy in the game. Once 
we had subjects answer the questionnaire before they played the game, this 
proportion was reduced to one half. We also report results from an additional 
condition in which there was a time gap of one week between filling out the 
questionnaire and playing the coordination game and show that the effect that the act 
of stating one’s own risk preferences produces on strategy choices is not ephemeral 
but rather endures for a rather long period of time. 
 Our results suggest an additional research question: If subjects do play best 
responses, could the change in strategic behavior induced by completing the 
questionnaire be explained by a change in the subjects’ risk preferences or a change 
in their beliefs? With the help of two additional conditions in which the subjects’ 
first-order beliefs were elicited, we addressed this research question and found little 
support for the idea that the act of completing the questionnaire changes beliefs. 
This result implies that, within a best-response correspondence framework, the 
systematic change in strategy choices after completing the questionnaire is induced 
by a change in subjects’ risk preferences. In particular, after completing the 
questionnaire about their own risk preferences, the subjects become on average more 
risk averse. 
 The result that the act of reporting one’s own risk preferences alters strategy 
choices in a subsequently played coordination game is unexpected in light of 
standard economic theories. We find evidence that people systematically violate the 
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requirement of consistency, which stipulates that in theoretically equivalent 
situations one will always choose the same alternative. Furthermore, our results 
challenge the idea that people make strategy choices based on deductive analysis. 
We attempt to explain our findings by means of focal points, framing and uncertain 
preferences. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the experimental 
design and procedure. Section 3 presents the research hypotheses and experimental 
results. In Section 4, we offer a short discussion aiming to provide some 
explanations of our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
2.1. Experimental Design 
In all the experiments we report in this paper, we use a two-conditions (in one 
condition subjects answer a questionnaire about their risk preferences and in the 
other they do not) between-subjects design. In total, we present and discuss the 
results from five conditions:  1) subjects played a 2 2× coordination game 
(Condition C); 2) subjects first completed a questionnaire about their own risk 
preferences and immediately after this they played a 2 2×  coordination game 
(Condition Q_C); 3) subjects first completed a questionnaire about their own risk 
preferences and one week later they played a 2 2×  coordination game (Condition 
Q_1W_C); 4) subjects stated their first-order beliefs and then played a 
2 2× coordination game (Condition B_C); 5) Subjects first completed a 
questionnaire about their own risk preferences, then stated their first-order beliefs 
and finally played a 2 2×  coordination game (Condition Q_B_C). Conditions C and 
B_C are our control conditions and conditions Q_C, Q_1W_C and Q_B_C are our 
treatment conditions. The dependent measure that we study by means of the first 
three conditions is the frequency with which each of the two strategies in the 2 2×  
coordination game is chosen. The last two conditions are used to examine the 
distribution of subjects’ beliefs about others’ choices in the coordination game. 
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 In all conditions, except condition Q_1W_C, consisting of more than one task, 
subjects performed the individual tasks one after the other, the only waiting time 
being associated with the time needed to collect the answer sheets from the first task 
and distribute the instructions and the answer sheets for the second (and third) 
task(s). In all conditions involving first completing the questionnaire and then 
performing additional tasks, subjects knew from the very beginning of the 
experiment that the experiment consisted of several parts but they did not have any 
further information about the second (and third) part. 
 The questionnaire consisted of three questions. All three questions were adapted 
from the general risk question used in the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey 
(SOEP).4 
In Question 1, subjects were asked whether they liked taking risks; In Question 2, 
whether they always tried to avoid risks. Admissible answers were “Agree,” 
“Disagree”, and “Neither agree nor disagree.” In the third question, subjects were 
asked to determine their risk preference with greater precision by positioning it on a 
scale of 0 (most risk loving) to 100 (most risk averse). The question that was most 
important for this study was the last one. The first two questions were added with 
the intention of making subjects take the time to carefully assess their attitudes to 
risk. 
 We define the baseline game as a one-shot symmetric 2 2×  normal form 
coordination game with two Pareto-ranked pure strategies Nash equilibria (A, A) 
and (B, B) and one equilibrium in mixed strategies (Figure 1). The entries of the 
payoff matrix are expressed in experimental currency units. The following exchange 
rate was used to convert them into euros: 25 ECU = 1 euro. The players had 
complete information about the strategy space and the payoff function. Each subject 
played the game against an anonymous other participant. 
 
                                                        
4 The general risk question in the SOEP survey is as follows: „How do you see yourself: are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a 
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: not at all willing to take risks, and the value 10 means: 
very willing to takes risks.” 
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FIGURE 1. —The baseline game 
 
 We used the quadratic scoring rule (Murphy and Winkler 1970) to elicit 
subjects’ first-order beliefs. Murphy and Winkler (1970) discuss two problems 
related to the suggested scoring rules—flatness and risk neutrality—which raise 
some questions about whether quadratic scoring rules provide an incentive-
compatible mechanism to elicit beliefs in real experimental settings. McKelvey and 
Page (1990) suggest an experimental design that deals with these problems. First, to 
relax the assumption of risk neutrality, they use a lottery version of the scoring rule. 
Second, to sharpen the incentives of the scoring rule, instead of paying a fixed 
amount for each lottery won, they pay according to a sliding scale. Selten et al. 
(1999) report, however, that even though money does not induce risk neutral 
behavior, binary lotteries are found to do even worse. That is why we decided to 
stick to the original version of the quadratic scoring rule and not to the one 
suggested by McKelvey and Page (1990). 
 Taking into consideration the remark of Kahneman and Tversky (1973) that 
even if subjects can quantify their beliefs they might find some forms of quantitative 
beliefs processing more meaningful than others, and following Biel (2009), we elicit 
beliefs by asking about the number of players (out of 100) who are believed to 
choose strategy A rather than about the probability with which a single opponent is 
believed to play a single action. Finally, to sharpen the incentives to report one’s 
true beliefs we set the maximal potential reward for the beliefs elicitation part 
considerably higher than the maximal remuneration that could be achieved in the 
coordination-game part. To avoid any portfolio or hedging effects, whether subjects 
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would be paid for the beliefs elicitation part or for the coordination game part was 
determined by a flip of a fair coin at the end of the experiment. 
 
2.2. Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was carried out at MaXLab, the experimental laboratory of the 
University of Magdeburg between March and November 2010. Participants were 
recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner 2004) from a pool consisting primarily of 
students from various faculties. We imposed only one restriction on the recruitment 
process: no economics or management students were invited to our experiment. The 
rationale for this restriction is that we wanted our subjects to make their choices in 
the 2 2×  coordination game based on their real risk preferences and beliefs rather 
than on other considerations, such as which strategy was the optimal one according 
to their game theory classes. None of the invited participants had any previous 
experience with coordination games. No subject participated in more than one 
session. Due to the simplicity of the experiment, it was carried out on a sheet of 
paper. All instructions were provided in German. In total, 192 subjects participated 
in our experiments—56 in condition C, 54 in condition Q_C, 35 in condition 
Q_1W_C, 24 in condition B_C and 23 in condition Q_B_C. 
 Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were seated in a single-person cabin 
with arrangements made to ensure their privacy. During the experiment, no 
communication was allowed among the participants. The written instructions were 
explained to the subjects also orally, and they were instructed to raise their hands if 
they had questions, which were then answered individually. The experiment 
consisted of one part for the subjects in the first condition, two parts for the subjects 
in the second, third and fourth conditions, and three parts for the subjects in the fifth 
condition. These were as detailed in the previous section. Depending on the 
treatment, the duration of the whole experiment took between 20 and 40 minutes. 
 No remuneration was provided for completing the questionnaire. However, 
subjects were instructed that their answers would be used for a research project and 
they were asked to try to be as accurate in their answers as possible. 
 In the coordination game part, subjects were individually instructed whether 
they were row or column players and were asked to choose either strategy A or 
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strategy B. To avoid any artifacts, all participants were made row players. They 
were also told that their payoff depended on the combination of their own strategy 
and the strategy played by a hidden player with whom they were going to be 
randomly matched once all players had completed their strategy choices. The 
matching procedure involved drawing a numbered ball from an urn containing n  
balls (with n  being the number of subjects in a given session) and writing down, in 
a special field on their answer sheets, the number on the ball. The balls in the urn 
were numbered consecutively from 1 to / 2n  and there were two balls with the 
same number. In this way, we matched subjects who had drawn a ball labeled with 
the same number. All subjects were informed about the matching procedure. 
 The payoff matrix presented in Figure 1 and the exchange rate of 25 ECU = 1 
euro were used to determine the remuneration for each subject, depending on her 
own strategy choice and that of her randomly matched partner. The maximum 
payoff subjects could earn during the coordination game part of the experiment was 
8 euros and the minimum payoff was 0 euros. The payoffs depended on the 
strategies that subjects and their randomly matched partners had chosen in the 2 2×  
coordination game, where Strategy A was the risky strategy, resulting in either the 
maximum possible payoff of 8 euros or the minimum possible payoff of 0 euros and 
Strategy B was the riskless strategy resulting in a payoff of at least 5 euros and at 
most 6 euros. 
 In the beliefs elicitation part of the experiment, subjects were asked to imagine 
that 100 individuals played the coordination game presented in Figure 1. They were 
then asked to write down the number of people from 100 (denoted as p ) whom they 
believed would play strategy A. Subjects’ payoff for this part of the experiment was 
then determined depending on one of the following states of the world: If their 
randomly assigned partner in the coordination game had chosen Strategy A, the euro 
payoff was calculated with the help of formula (1), otherwise the euro payoff was 
calculated with the help of formula (2). 
(1) 
2
15 15 1
100
p⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
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(2) 
2
15 15
100
p⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. 
Participants were told that their payoff would be maximized if they reported their 
true beliefs. In addition, for [ ]0,100p∈ and each state of the world, subjects were 
shown tables in which their payoff was calculated depending on p (payoffs were 
calculated in increments of 5). The maximum payoff subjects could earn for stating 
their beliefs was 15 euros and the minimum payoff was 0 euros. The exact payoff 
depended on p and on the state of the world. The average payoff subjects received 
for this part was around 10 euros. The beliefs elicitation part was always followed 
by the coordination game and subjects were instructed that at the end of the 
experiment they would be paid either for the beliefs elicitation part or for the 
coordination game part, with the decision being taken on the basis of a fair coin flip. 
 
3. Hypotheses and Results 
 
We present in this section our research hypotheses and experimental results. We first 
discuss our main hypothesis regarding the relationship between the act of stating 
one’ own risk preferences and strategy choices in a subsequently played 
coordination game. To gain additional insights into the motivational bases of 
subjects in the coordination game, we address also the question whether beliefs 
elicitation influences choices in the coordination game. Furthermore, we present the 
distributions of self-reported beliefs and risk preferences and discuss how they relate 
to actions in the coordination game. 
 One assumption of standard economic theory is the so-called internal 
consistency of preferences, which states that in theoretically equivalent situations 
people will always choose the same alternative. A common feature of all theories of 
equilibrium selection in coordination games is their reliance on deductive analysis. 
Deductive equilibrium analysis prescribes what strategy choices rational players 
should make under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, if they use 
only the information provided by the game, i.e., strategy space and payoff structure. 
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In other words, subjects’ strategy choices are assumed to be independent of 
historical accidents and dynamic processes. The following hypotheses should find 
support, if the participants in our experiment behave according to either of these two 
normative principles. 
Hypothesis 1: The act of stating one’s own risk preferences does not have any 
impact on the behavioral choices made in the subsequently played 
2 2× coordination game. 
Hypothesis 2: The act of stating one’s own first-order beliefs does not have any 
impact on the behavioral choices made in the subsequently played 
2 2×  coordination game. 
The hypothesis of key interest for this study is the first one, but as we have two 
conditions in which we elicit subjects’ first-order beliefs, it is important to control 
for any effects that the act of stating one’s beliefs may exert on strategy choices 
made in the coordination game. 
 The summary data of the distributions of choices in the coordination game from 
conditions C, Q_C, Q_1W_C and B_C are given in Table 1. We performed one-
tailed Z-test for the significance of the difference between two proportions for each 
of the following sample pairs—C vs. Q_C, C vs. Q_1W_C and C vs. B_C. The 
corresponding z-statistics and p-values are reported in the last two rows of Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of strategy choices in the coordination game 
       C   Q_C  Q_1W_C B_C 
Number of participants  56   54   35   24 
Strategy A chosen   37 (66 %) 27 (50%) 19 (54%) 15 (63 %) 
Strategy B chosen   19 (34 %) 27 (50%) 16 (46%) 9 (37 %) 
z-statistics     -   1.7083  1.1243  -0.3069 
p-value      -   0.0438** 0.1305  0.3795 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
12 
 
Looking first at the data from condition C and Q_C, we observe that approximately 
one third of the subjects in condition C played strategy B in the coordination game, 
while this strategy was chosen by as much as one half of all subjects in condition 
Q_C. The p-value of 0.0438 indicates that the difference between the proportion of 
subjects playing the risk dominant strategy B in condition C and Q_C is significant 
at the 5 percent level. That is, subjects who first reported their own risk preferences 
and then played the coordination game, chose strategy B more often than subjects 
who played the game right away. 
 This result is unexpected in light of the assumption of the internal consistency 
of preferences in standard economic theory. It is inconsistent also with the 
assumption of strategy selection based on deductive analysis. Subjects in both 
conditions C and Q_C played exactly the same coordination game under exactly the 
same conditions (i.e., recruiting process, matching procedure). The only difference 
between the two groups is the fact that subjects from condition Q_C first stated their 
own risk preference in a short questionnaire and then played the game, while 
subjects in condition C started by playing the game. Our experimental data provide 
significant evidence that the distribution of strategy choices in the coordination 
game changes depending on whether subjects were asked to assess and state their 
risk preferences. Based on this evidence, we reject Hypothesis 1. 
 It is interesting to examine whether the effect which the act of stating one’s own 
risk preference produces on strategy choice in the coordination game is ephemeral or 
lasts for some time. In condition Q_C, the coordination game was played 
immediately after completing the questionnaire. In contrast, in condition Q_1W_C, 
subjects completed the questionnaire one week before they played the coordination 
game. Looking at the third column in Table 1, we observe that the proportion of 
subjects who played strategy B is higher by 11 percent in condition Q_1W_C than in 
condition C. The p-value of 0.1305 indicates that this difference is not statistically 
significant. However, it is relatively large and it is in the same direction as the 
difference between condition C and Q_C. This observation provides some evidence 
about the robustness of the result that the risk dominant strategy B is more often 
played after reporting one’s own risk preferences. It also indicates that the effect of 
completing the questionnaire is not ephemeral but rather endures for some time. 
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 In the last column of Table 1, we report the distribution of choices in the 
coordination game made in condition B_C, in which we first asked subjects to state 
their first order beliefs and then let them play the game. The proportions of subjects 
choosing each of the strategies in the game in that condition are almost identical to 
the proportions in condition C. This impression is confirmed also by the 
insignificant p-value of 0.3795. Based on this result, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2. 
 One approach to the strategy selection problem in the coordination game could 
be derived from the game’s reaction correspondence (best response 
correspondence). Based on her best response correspondence, each player will 
choose to play A (B) if she believes that the other player in playing A with 
probability β  larger (smaller) than β , where the threshold value β corresponds to 
the mixed-strategies equilibrium. From this definition it follows that a strategy 
choice in the coordination game is a function of the subject’s beliefs and risk 
preferences with the theoretical effect of beliefs optimism working opposite to the 
effect of risk aversion. 
Table 2: 
Summary statistics of self-reported beliefs and risk preferences 
       B_C Q_B_C  Q_C  Q_1W_C  
Number of participants  24  23   54   35 
Average      68  74   47   48 
Median      70  85   42.5  55 
p-value      0.192    0.883 
       Q_C    B_C & Q_B_C 
       A  B   A  B  
Number of participants  27  27   33  14  
Average      43  51.5  81  43 
Median      40  55   85  42.5 
p-value      0.087*    5.97E-7*** 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
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 We observed a change in strategic behavior after the act of completing the 
questionnaire. We will now examine whether this change in strategic behavior was 
triggered by a change in the distribution of the subjects’ beliefs. Keeping everything 
else constant, subjects will play strategy B more often if they believe that it is less 
likely to encounter a partner who is playing strategy A (i.e., if they hold more 
pessimistic beliefs). The summary statistics of the distribution of beliefs from 
conditions B_C and Q_B_C are given in the first two columns of the upper panel of 
Table 2. The whole distributions of self-reported beliefs in these two treatments are 
depicted in panel a) of Figure 2. All p-values reported in Table 2 are calculated by 
means of a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test with the null hypothesis that Vectors 
x and y are independent samples from two continuous distributions with equal 
medians. 
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FIGURE 2.—Distributions of self-reported beliefs and risk preferences 
 
 Our “belief measure” corresponds to the number of people out of 100 which our 
participants believed would play strategy A on the coordination game. We observe 
from Table 1 that the median belief was higher in condition Q_B_C than in 
condition B_C. This difference, however, is not only insignificant but it is also in the 
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opposite direction from what we would have expected was a change in beliefs 
responsible for the change in strategy choices in the coordination game. Panel a) of 
Figure 2 also does not depict any pronounced difference between the distribution of 
beliefs in the two treatments. From these results we conclude that the act of 
reporting ones’ own risk preferences does not change the distribution of first-order 
beliefs. 
 We have not yet discussed the answers given in the questionnaire. The main 
reason to postpone the discussion about the distribution of risk preferences was that 
we wanted to stress the point that the act of self-assessing and stating one’s own risk 
preferences changes strategic behavior in the subsequently played coordination 
game and that the precise answers given in the questionnaire are not important for 
the observed shift in behavior. We also argued that it is not clear whether one-
dimensional incentive-incompatible risk questions are a good method for measuring 
risk preferences. However, for the sake of completeness, in the last two columns of 
the upper panel of Table 2 we present the summary statistics of the self-reported risk 
preferences on Question 3 from condition Q_C and Q_1W_G (we do not report the 
exact answers from the first two questions because they were very general and 
subjects often answered them inconsistently or by “neither agree nor disagree”). The 
distribution patterns from these two treatments are depicted in panel b) of Figure 2. 
Subjects from the two conditions did not report statistically different risk 
preferences. We also observe that approximately half of the subjects said that they 
were risk loving and half said that they were risk averse.  
 From the first two columns of the lower panel of Table 2 and panel c) of Figure 
2, we observe that subjects who played strategy B in the coordination game reported 
that they were on average slightly more risk averse than subjects who played 
strategy A. This difference is significant only at the 10 percent level and does not 
provide strong evidence that subjects playing the risk dominant strategy have 
different risk preferences from the subjects that play the payoff dominant strategy in 
the coordination game. 
 In contrast to self-reported risk preferences, self-reported beliefs have strong 
predictive power for the strategy choices in the coordination game. In the last two 
columns of the lower panel of Table 2 we present the summary statistics of beliefs 
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held by subjects who played each of the two strategies in the coordination game.  
(To obtain a larger sample size we pooled the data from conditions Q_B_C and 
B_C. This is possible, because as we showed above the act of completing the 
questionnaire does not change the distribution of beliefs.) The median belief of 
subjects who played A is twice as high as the median belief of subjects who played 
B. The difference between the two distributions is significant at the 1 percent level. 
In panel d) of Figure 2 it is also clear that subjects who played Strategy A held more 
optimistic beliefs than subjects who played Strategy B. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Our main result, that the act of reporting one’s own risk preferences alters strategy 
choices in a subsequently played coordination game, is not predicted by standard 
economic theories. Our experimental data show that people systematically violate 
the requirement of consistency. Furthermore, it turns out to be difficult to justify the 
finding that the change in strategic behavior in the coordination game (after 
completing the questionnaire) is not triggered by a change in beliefs. This is 
because, under the assumption that subjects’ behavioral choices can be readily 
analyzed within the reaction-correspondence framework of the coordination game, 
the result of no change in beliefs after completing the questionnaire implies that the 
change in strategic behavior is triggered by an increase in subjects’ risk aversion. 
This argument, however, is at odds with the assumption of stable risk preferences. 
The results we report in this paper also challenge the idea that players choose 
strategy choices based on deductive analysis. We now present several arguments 
from behavioral economics and quantum game theory which might be used to 
explain our findings. 
 
4.1. Focal Points 
 
One behavioral approach to strategy selection in coordination games rests on the 
idea of focal points. Schelling’s (1960) seminal experiments show that people are 
sometimes able to successfully coordinate their actions by drawing on a shared 
perception of “prominence” or “salience.” In one experiment, for example, Schelling 
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(1960) reports that, when asked to choose between heads and tails in a coin flipping 
2 2×  game paying one unit of payoff, if both players choose the same strategy and 
zero otherwise, 86 percent of his American subjects chose heads. This result was 
replicated for subjects in England by Mehta et al. (1994a, 1994b), who found that an 
almost identical 87 percent of the participants chose heads. Schelling’s (1960) 
concept of salience is based on the idea that people in coordination games are 
looking for strategies that “suggest themselves” and are obvious or natural.  
 Many researchers argue that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a natural focal 
point in (symmetric) coordination games (see e.g., Schelling 1960, Harsanyi and 
Selten 1988). Colman (1997) provides a psychological justification, the so called 
Stackelberg heuristic, of focusing on and therefore selecting the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium. Our experimental data, do indeed show that in condition C, in which 
subjects play only the coordination games, approximately two thirds of the 
participants chose the Pareto-dominant strategy A. If people choose strategies based 
on silence, the distribution of choices in the coordination game in condition Q_C, 
could then be explained by a change in subjects’ perception of which strategy is 
more salient after answering the questionnaire. After reporting their own risk 
preferences, subjects start to explicitly think about risk and probably recognize that 
their partners also explicitly think about risk. As a result, it might appear to some of 
them that the risk dominant strategy B is the more natural choice.  
 
4.2. Framing 
 
A concept closely related to the phenomenon of focal points is framing. For 
example, the salience of strategies might be varied by varying their labels, which are 
part of the way in which a decisions problem is framed. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) define a decision frame as the “decision-maker’s conception of the acts, 
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice.” They further argue 
that the “frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation 
of the problem and partly by the norms, habits and personal characteristics of the 
decision-maker.” It is often possible to frame the same decision problem in several 
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different ways.
5
 Tversky and Kahneman (1981) also show that framing a decision 
problem in terms of gains induces risk-averse behavior, while framing it in terms of 
losses induces risk-loving behavior. 
 The effect of different specifications of the decision problem on strategy 
selection in coordination games was extensively studied (e.g., complete vs. 
incomplete information games [Harsanyi and Selten 1988, Carlsson and van Damme 
1993], games with a larger number of players vs. games with a smaller number of 
players [Van Huyck et al. 1990], games with preplay communication vs. games 
without preplay communication [Cooper et al. 1992], games with local interaction 
vs. games without local interaction [Berninghaus et al. 2002]). Decision frames, 
however, according to the definition of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) are 
determined not only by the external structure of the game but also by the personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker. Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) also stress 
the importance of the subjective perception of the game influenced by subjects’ 
personal characteristics. They define a decision frame as the set of variables subjects 
use to conceptualize the game. They further note that frames may vary both across 
players and from occasion to occasion.  
 In our experiments, subjects in all conditions played the same coordination 
game. Thus, the difference in the distributions of choices between conditions C and 
Q_C cannot be explained by the external structure of the game. It is possible, 
however, that subjects who reported their risk preferences perceived the decision 
problem they were faced with in the coordination game differently from subjects 
                                                        
5 In a famous experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1981), demonstrated the power of frames to 
influence decision choices, as follows. Subjects were told to imagine that the US was preparing for 
the outbreak of a disease, which was expected to kill 600 people. To combat the disease two 
programs had been proposed, whose consequences were known. Subjects in problem 1 were asked to 
choose between program A and B. Subjects in problem 2 were asked to choose between program C 
and D. The number in the brackets after each program shows what percentage of the participants 
chose the given program. 
Program A:  If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72 percent] 
Program B:  If program B is adopted, there is one third probability that 600 people will be  
   saved, and two thirds probability that no people will be saved. [28 percent] 
Program C:  If problem C is adopted, 400 people will die. [22 percent] 
Program D:  If program D is adopted, there is one third probability that nobody will die, and two 
   thirds probability that 600 people will die. [78 percent] 
Problem 1 and 2 are effectively identical but the preferences over the different alternatives in the two 
problems are very different. The results of this experiment show that people are risk-averse for gains 
and risk-loving for losses. 
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who had not completed the questionnaire. Depending on their reference point for 
example, the choice between the two strategies in the coordination game can be 
represented as a choice between lotteries framed in terms of gains (if the reference 
point is one of the payoffs [or some combination of them] that are associated with 
the risk dominant strategy) or in terms of losses (if the reference point is the highest 
attainable payoff associated with the equilibrium point [A, A]). According to the 
specific frame subjects adopt in describing the coordination game to themselves, 
some subjects will try to avoid taking risks and opt for the risk dominant strategy B, 
while others will seek out risk and opt for the Pareto-dominant strategy A. 
Following this argumentation, we can argue that, in our experiment, in condition 
Q_C more subjects perceived the decision problem in the coordination game as a 
choice between lotteries formulated in terms of gains than in condition C, and as a 
consequence more subjects in the condition with the questionnaire opted for the risk 
dominant strategy. 
 
4.3. Uncertain Preferences 
 
In standard economic theory, the type of a player is deterministic. It is assumed that 
people have stable preferences which do not interact with or depend on the specific 
environment in which decisions are made. This view is very restrictive and leaves 
many behaviors that are observed in experiments or in real life unexplained. 
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2009) introduce a model of uncertain preferences based 
on the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. In the quantum mechanical 
framework, the type of a player is not deterministic. Rather there is inherent 
indeterminacy of preferences. The main idea in the Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. 
(2009) framework is to view the type of a person as a quantum mechanical system. 
The following analogy is used to link quantum mechanics to uncertain preferences. 
Any decision situation is modeled as a measurement of a player’s type. The result of 
this measurement is one element from the set of all possible actions in the given 
decision situations. Prior to the decision situation, every player is in a state that is a 
linear combination of all possible behaviors (that is, all possible elements in the set 
of actions) that can be adopted in the decision situation. When subjects are asked to 
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make a decision, one of all possible behaviors is realized and translated into the 
specific actions subjects take. 
 One interesting property of a quantum system is that depending on whether two 
(or more) decision situations “do not commute” or “commute”, an order effect will 
or will not be observed, respectively.  In the case when the decisions situations 
“commute”, the predictions of the quantum model of preferences coincide with the 
predictions of standard economic theory. But if the two decision situations “do not 
commute”, people will make different choices depending on the order in which the 
decision situations have been encountered. An inconvenience associated with the 
quantum mechanical framework is that the only way to ascertain whether two 
decision situations commute is through experiments. Once this is done, however, 
many different behavioral phenomena can be easily explained by allowing that 
subjects possess uncertain preferences. 
 We considered the following decision situations: One decision situation was to 
assess and state one’s own risk preferences and the other was to choose strategy A 
or B in the coordination game. We found that strategy choices made in the 
coordination game in the condition in which the subjects played the coordination 
game right away were different from strategy choices made in the condition in 
which subjects first reported their risk preferences. Based on this result and the 
quantum framework of risk preferences we can argue that the questionnaire and the 
coordination games are two decision situations which do not commute and that 
therefore the order in which they are played matters for the determination of actual 
choices. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study reports experimental evidence that strategy choices in a one-shot 
symmetric 2 2×   coordination game are systematically altered by the act of stating 
one’s own risk preferences. To be precise, subjects who completed the questionnaire 
about their risk preferences more often chose the risk dominant strategy in the 
coordination game. This result contradicts the assumption of internal consistency of 
preferences. In addition, it implies that people rely on inductive rather than on 
deductive principles when making strategy choices. We also find that the change in 
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behavioral choices in the coordination game played after completing the 
questionnaire was not induced by a change in beliefs. Within a best-response 
correspondence framework, these two results taken together imply that subjects 
should have become on average more risk averse after reporting their risk 
preferences. This argument raises questions about the stability of risk preferences. 
We argue that focal points, framing and uncertain preferences could be used to 
explain our results. 
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Appendix Written Experimental Instructions 
 
In this appendix, we include the written experimental instructions of Condition 
Q_B_C. The instructions of all other conditions can be replicated from the written 
experimental instructions of Condition Q_B_C. In particular: In Condition C, 
subjects were only asked to play the 2 2× coordination game; In Condition Q_C, 
subjects were instructed to first fill out the questionnaire about their own risk 
preferences and immediately after that to play the 2 2× coordination game; In 
Condition Q_1W_C, subjects first filled out the questionnaire about their own risk 
preferences and one week later they played the 2 2× coordination game; In 
Condition B_C, subjects were asked to state their first order beliefs and then play the 
2 2× coordination game. 
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Condition Q_B_G 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you will find the description of the 
experiment and then you will be asked to make a series of decisions. Please read the 
following information very carefully. If you have any questions, please ask before 
the experiment starts. Please note that during the whole experiment, communication 
with the other participants is not allowed. Thank you! 
 
The Experiment 
This is a hand-run experiment consisting of two parts. You get separate instructions 
for each part of the experiment. Please write a chosen from you pseudonym in the 
upper right blank on your decision sheets. Please read the complete instructions at 
first and ask any questions you may have. After that, please make your decisions. 
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about your earnings and you will 
be privately paid.  
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Part 1 
Instructions 
In this part of the experiment you are asked to answer several questions about your 
personality. Please answer question 1 and question 2 with “Agree”, “Disagree” or 
“Neither agree nor disagree”. In question 3, you are asked to position yourself on a 
scale between 0 and 100 according to your risk preferences, where 0 indicates the 
maximal risk-loving behavior, 100 indicated the maximal risk-averse behavior. 
Please note that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. The results are being used 
in scientific research, so please try to be as accurate as possible in answering the 
questions. 
 
The questionnaire 
 
1. I like taking risks 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree 
nor disagree 
2. I always try to avoid 
situations involving risk 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree 
nor disagree 
3. Please position yourself on the following scale between 0 and 100 according to 
your risk preferences, where 0 indicates the maximal risk-loving behavior, 100 
indicated the maximal risk-averse behavior. 
 
          
0          10          20          30         40          50         60          70          80          90       100  
risk-loving                                                                                                      risk-averse 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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Part II 
Instructions 
The following game is played one time. You will be told whether you play as the 
“Row player” or as the “Column player”. Your partner plays the other role. You will 
be randomly matched with your partner upon competition of your decision choice. 
The table bellow shows the game you play: 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
You have to decide between the two possible strategies A and B. Your payoff 
depends on your decision as well as on the strategy selected by your partner. There 
are four possible strategy combinations (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), (B, B). In the table 
above, you can find the corresponding payoffs. The first number in a field represents 
the payoff of the row player and the second number represents the payoff of the 
column player. The payoffs are given in experimental currency units (ECU). 
 
Payoff mechanism 
Your payoff depends on the resulting strategy combination. Please note that the 
payoffs in the table are given in ECU. To convert the given payoffs in Euro please 
use the following exchange rate: 
 
25 ECU = 1 Euro 
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Decision 1 
Imagine that 100 subjects play this game.  
Please write down how many subjects (a number p between 0 and 100) out of the 
100 subjects you believe would play strategy A.  
Payoff mechanism for decision 1 
For the determination of your payoff, you will be randomly matched with a partner. 
Your payoff will be determined according to one of the following two cases: 
Case 1: Your partner has chosen strategy A:  Example for the amount of your payoff in  
Case 1 for different values of p : 
 
2
15 15 1
100
pPayoff ⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
 
p = number of players (out of 100) whom you 
believe would play strategy  A 
 p = 0  0,00 euros p = 55  11.96 euros 
 p = 5  1,46 euros p = 60  12.60 euros 
 p = 10  2,85 euros p = 65  13.16 euros 
 p = 15  4,16 euros p = 70  13.65 euros 
 p = 20  5,40 euros p = 75  14.06 euros 
 p = 25  6,56 euros p = 80  14.40 euros 
 p = 30  7,65 euros p = 85  14,66 euros 
 p = 35  8,66 euros p = 90  14,85 euros 
 p = 40  9,60 euros p = 95  14,96 euros 
 p = 45  10,46 euros p = 100 15,00 euros 
 p = 50  11.25 euros  
     
Case 2: Your partner has chosen strategy B:  Example for the amount of your payoff in  
Case 2 for different values of p : 
 
2
15 15
100
pPayoff ⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
 
p = number of players (out of 100) whom you 
believe would play strategy  A 
 p = 0  15,00 euros p = 55  10.46 euros 
 p = 5  14,96 euros p = 60  9,60 euros 
 p = 10  14,85 euros p = 65  8,66 euros 
 p = 15  14,66 euros p = 70  7,65 euros 
 p = 20  14,40 euros p = 75  6,56 euros 
 p = 25  14,06 euros p = 80  5,40 euros 
 p = 30  13,65 euros p = 85  4,16 euros 
 p= 35  13,16 euros p = 90  2,85 euros 
 p = 40  12,60 euros p = 95  1,46 euros 
 p = 45 11,96 euros p = 100  0,00 euros 
 p = 50  11,25 euros  
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Please note 
With the above-described payoff mechanism, your (expected) payoff will be 
maximized if you state your true beliefs. 
Decision 2 
You play the game with your randomly assigned partner from Decision 1. 
Payoff mechanism for decision 2: 
Your payoff is determined by the combination of your own strategy choice and that 
of your partner. 
Please note 
You will be remunerated for only one of the two decisions. The decision which will 
be paid out will be randomly determined (by a toss of a fair coin) at the end of the 
experiment. If “heads” falls, Decision 1 will be paid out. If “tails” falls, Decision 2 
will be paid out. 
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Decision sheet 
Decision 1 
Please make your Decision 1 now.  
 
p =  
   
(p = number of players (out of 100) whom you believe will play strategy A) 
 
Decision 2 
You play as the “Row player”. Please make your decision now. 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
Please indicate the strategy you choose to play in the field below. 
 
 
Now you will be randomly assigned a participants number. Please record that 
number in the field bellow. 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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